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We introduce the operation of possibility qualification and show how I this modal-like operator can be used to represent "typical" or default 
knowledge in a theory of nonmonotonic reasoning. We investigate the 
representational power of this ·approach I by· looking at a number of 
prototypical problems from the nonmonotoni� reasoning literature. 
particular we look at the so called Yale shooting problem and its 
to priority in default reasoning. 
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Introduction 
I 
The constrluction of useful• knowledge based systems requires the 
representation and manipulation of so called commonsense knowledge ClJ. 
Commonsense knowledge is very often characterized by pieces of knowledge I 
that are usuallY. true but not ne�essarily always.true. Many rules of thu 
can be considered in this category. Stereotypical characterizations are 
another e�<ample of this category. Two distinct avenues e>:ist for handlinl 
these types of knowledge. The first approach is to put this type of 
commonsense knowledge in to a probabilisti� framework. [2,3,4J.· The second 
approach is to consider objects typical, having the characteristic in 11 question unless qtherwise informed. This second approach has been the m91r 
avenue thus far followed by the AI community [5J. The essential feature of 
this second approach is the assumption of a piece of knowledge without 1 
conclusive evidence of its truth. Within this approach one assumes some 
piece of commonsense knowledge as valid if it is consistent or possible · 
within the framework of what we already know. As Etherington [6] elegantly 
puts it "In commonsense reasoning assumptions· are often made based upon I both supporting evidence f\nd the absence of contradictorv evidence." 
In [7J Yager introduced a reasoning system called possibilistic 
reasoning. This system is rooted in the theory of approximate reasoning 1 
[8J. This system provides a set based, framework for representing 
knowledge. We feel this system· provides both· the conceptual simplicity a 
a well developed reasoning system described as desirable by Imielinski[9J. 
In addition it allows for the representation of partial matching and otht 
methods for handling imprecise information. It also allows f.or the 
inclusion of probabilistic information.[10J� 
In [7J Yager has suggested that we can use possibility qualification� 
as a basis for the implementation of many diff,erent kinds of commonsense 
knowledge. A possibility qualified statement is 
. 
· N i� A is possible. 
This statement characterizes a piece of information that says our knowle� 
of the value of V is such that it is· possible <or consistent with it> to 
assume that V lies in the set A. · Note that it doesn't specifically say V 
1 i es in A. Formally this statement gets translated into I V is A .... 
where A+ is a subset of the power set of the base set X. 
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A•(G) = Poss [A/Gl = MaiM [A<x> A G(x)] 
Essentially A .... is made up o-f the subsets o-f X which intersect, are 
consistent, with A. ' 
Representation of Commonsense Knowledge 
In this secti'on we shall investigate the representation of some 
primary types of commonsense know l edge by the possibilistic reasoning 
approach. 
We shall initially consider the statement 
typ ic ally V is A� 
Within the framework of the default system of Re iter [11] the above 
statement gets represented as a default rule of the form 
:M<V is A> / V is A. 
The operator :M(F) p l ays a central role in Reiter's theory. It essentiall·'f 
means "if we have not established ,F as true. " Reiter sometimes refer's 
to it as a consistency op4rator. Thus the interpretation of "typically V 
is A" afforded by Reiter 's default reason ing system is to say "if we have 
not established V is ,A then assume Vis A. '� It is particularly worth 
nothing that :M<F> is satisf i ed if either F is true or F is unknown. Thus 
we see that this operator is essent ially the possibility operator which we 
descr i bed earlier. Armed with the set based representations of appro�-:imate 
reasoning we easily formalize this type of knowledge. Thus essential l y we 
can trans l ate 
:1'-HV is A> / V is A 
into the possibility reasoning representation 
if V, is A is possible then V is A. 
Using our transl ation rules we get 
if V is A• then V is A 
This translates into 
V is ,(A ... > U A. 
We shall denote ,{A•) as A*� hence we get 
V is <A* U A>. 
Furthermore assume that owr knowl edge base consists simply of the fact that 
V is B. 
Combining this with our typical knowledge we get 
V is D 
where D = {A* n B> U <A n B>. 
Since A* is a subset Of the power set of X and B is a subset of X we 
convert B into a sub set of the power set, thus 
B = {1/B}. 
Furthermore as d i ·scussed in [j', lOJ . 
A* n B = < <1 - Poss[A/BJ ) I B} 
which in turn can be e xpressed as a subset of X, M, where 
M<x> = B<x> A <1-Poss[A/BJ) 
thus 
D<x> = (B(x) A (1-Poss[A/Bl> v CA(x) A B<x)). 
Two extremal cases should be noted. If our typical value A is 
completely inconsistent with our known value, A n B = $, then Poss[A/Bl = C 
and thus 
D<:<> = Bb:> 
and hence 
V is B 
Thus in this case we have discounted our typica l information when it 
conflicted with our knowledge-baseJ69 
On the other hand if A has some consistency with B, A 0 B � �, thus 
Poss [A/BJ = 1 then we get 
D <x> = B <x> A A(x) 
and hence 
V is A 0 B. 
Thus when our typical knowledge doesn't contradict our firm knowledge we 
conjunct these sources of knowledge. 
In the special case when B is unknown, B = X, then we get 
V is A. 
Complementary Default Rules 
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An important class of default.type rules are those in which we have two 
complementary propositions. An example of this situation is 
typically Quakers are pacifists 
typically Republicans are non-pacifists 
More formally these rules are characterized by 
P1: typically if V is A then U is B 
P2: typically if W is C then U is B-. 
A coherent reasoning system should report U is B if all we know 
is A. If all we know is V is C then we should infer U is a-. If we 
neither A nor C or both A and C then we should report unknown for U. 
us see how our structure handles this kind of knowledge. 
We represent P1 as If V is A and U is B is possible then U is B 
similarly for P2 If W is C and U is a- is possible then U is a-. 
Formally we get 
Conjuncting 
P1: A- U B* U B <where B* = not <B is possible} 
P2: c- U B• U a- <where B• = not <not B is possible> 
these pieces of information gives us 
H = A- 0 c- U c- 0 B* U c- 0 B U B• 0 A- U B• 0 B* 
u a· o B u a- o A- u a- o a·. 
We let X ,  Y and Z denote the base sets of A, B and C respectively. 
Furthermore we note that B• 0 B* = �­
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In the case where the value of V and W are unknown our knowledge 
simply consists of H. Hence U is G where G <y> = Ma�< .. ,z <H <�-:, z,z)). Howevf 
since Max:z,M rc-<z> A A- <x>J = 1 it follows G <y> = 1 and thus u is unknow • 
If V is A and W is unknown we conjunct H with A and get 
H" = <c- 0 B n A> U <B• 0 B 0 A> U <B* 0 A <B- U c-> 
From this we can infer that U is 6' where I 
G'(y) = B <y> v <B <y> A <1-Poss [B-/BJ>> v <Y<y> A <1-Poss <BIY>>> 
which results in 6' <y> = B <y> v B <y> v 0 = B <y>. Thus in the case where w' 
know V is A we correctly infer U is B. 
It can be easily shown, in a symmetric manner, if all we know is tha 
w is c that we infer u is a-. 
The final case corresponds to the situation in which we know both V t 
A and W is C. In this case we conjunct A fl C with H to get H" 
= B• 0 B U a- 0 B*. 
Projecting onto Y we get Projv H" = B<y> U s- <y> = 1, hence in this cas� 
we get U is "unknown" Thus we see that our system makes the correct 
inference in the face of complimentary default rules. 
I 
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Priority in Default Rules 
In (12] Hanks and McDermott introduced a problem which raised a number 
of significant issues for the use of non-monotonic reasoning schemes. In 
[13] Pearl discusses a modified version of this problem which he aptly 
calls "the Yale shooting problem." We shall investigate this modified 
version of the Hanks-McDermott problem su.ggested by Pearl as an e!-�ample of 
use of our methodology as well as a vehicle to introduce a number of 
meta-rules useful in providing priority information for non-monotonic type 
knowledge. 
Assume we have a knowledge base which consists of the following 
four pieces of commonsense knowledge: 
D�: typically if a gun is loaded at time 1 it is loaded at time t2 
D2: typically if a person is alive at time t2 he is alive at t� 
D3: typically if a person is alive at time t2 and shot at tz and the 
gun is loaded at tz then their not alive at t3 
D4: typically if a person is alive at time tz and shot at tz with a gun 
that is unloaded at tz then they are alive at t3 
We shall use the fDllowing notation 
A� - alive at time t�; L� - gun loaded at t�; s� - gun shot at t� 
Using our notation we have the following representation of out knowledge 
D1: L1 and L::z is possible then L2 
Dz: A2 and A3 is possible then A3 
D3: A2 and Sz and Lz and A3 is possible then A-3 
D4: A2 and 82 and not L::z and A3 is possible then A3 
This can be formally expressed as 
D�: L-1 U L� U Lz 
Dz: A-z U A� U A3 
D3: A-z U S-2 L-z U A3 U A-� 
D4: A-z U S-2 U L::z U A� U A3 
In addition to these four default rules we have the following three 
pieces of factual knowledge L1, Az and Sz. 
We now introduce two other pieces of knowledge. These are two pieces 
of meta-knowledge with respect to priorities on the introduction of default 
rules 
MR-1: (1) specialization priority 
MR-2: (2) temporal priority 
We shall first discuss in turn these two meta priority rules. 
Assume we have two default rules: 
R1: typically (if A then E) 
Rz: typically <if A and B then G> 
The meta-rule of specialization priority says that Rz has priority 
over R1, it is introduced first. In a simplistic way we see for this is 
that R::z has less potential e>�ceptions than R1, since B is not an e>:ception. 
The second rule, �emporal priority, is.closely related to Shoham's 
concept of chronological ignorance [14] as well as the basic idea of 
causality. It is a principle useful for knowledge (default rules) that 
have a predictive nature to them. The essential idea'responsible for this 
meta priority rule is an assumed causality in the world. The basic idea 
here is that anything that happens in the world at time t� must be caused 
by things that happened in the world at times before t�, t � t�. Thus this 
requires objects in the antecedent of predictive rule happen before the 
consequent. Essentially this principle states that if 
R1: Typically CR1 f<t1> � f<tz)] 
R::z: Typically [R2 f(t3) � f(t4>J 
and if t:z < t ... then R1 can be i ntrctcltlced prior to R2• 
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Having discussed these meta rules we are now in a position to make 
appropriate inferences based upon our knowledge base: commonsense 
knowledge, facts and meta-priority rules. 
The following analysis sets up the appropriate priority schedule. 
start with seven pieces of data 
I 
F1, F:z, F�, D1, D:z, D�, 04 
Because F1, F2, ·F� are facts not default knowledge 
after the F's hence we get 
the D's get introduced�� 
· <F1, F2, F�} 
prior to 
{01, D:z, n�, D4} 
Because of the principle of temporal priority, D1 has an earlier time 
its consequent, D:z, o� and 04 get introduced after D:�.. Thus we have 
<F1, F:z, F�} 
prior to 
{0:�.} 
prior to 
{D:z, o�, 04} 
in 
Because of 
o� and 04. 
the principle specialization priority 
Thus our final priority schedule is 
<F:�., F2, F�} 
D:z gets introduced after 
prior to 
{01} 
prior to 
<D�, 04} 
prior to 
{D:z} 
We start by simultaneously 
letting H b e  a knowledge we get 
introducing the facts L:�., A:z and S:z thus 
H = L:s. n A::z n S::z 
Next we introduce D:�., thus we get 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
H = L1 0 A:z n S:z 0 
H = A:z n S:z 0 L:�. n 
We effect the rule D:s. by effecting the 
is possible we obtain 
<L-1 U L� U L:z> 
<L; U L:z> 
second order knowledge L;, since Ll 
H = A:z n S:z n L:s. 0 L:z 
We next simultaneously introduce 03 and 04 
Hence 
H = <A:z n S:z n L:z 0 L:s.> 0 <A-:z U s-:z 
0 <A-:z U s-:z U L-:z U A� U A�>-
H = A:z 0 S:z n L:z n L1 n [L:z U A� U A�l 0 [A� U A-�l 
H = A2 0 L2 n Lc•. n S:z n [ L:z 0 A� U L2 n A-� U A� () A� 
U A� 0 A-� U A� n A�J 
H = A2 n Lz n L1 n Sz n <A� U A-3) 
Effecting A�, since there is nothing stopping A-� we get 
H = S:z 0 L:z n L1 n S:z n [A� U A-�] 
Finally introducing D:z, we get 
H = S:z 0 L:z n A:z n A-� n L1 n <A-:z U A� U A�> 
H = S:z 0 L:z 0 A:z n A-� n L1 0 A� 
Since A� = { A-�, 0 } its intersection with A-� is A-� we get that the 
final version of H after the inclusion of all our knowledge is 
H = S:z 0 L:z n A:z n A-� n L:�.. 
From this it follows that A-� is true. Hence our victim is not alive at 
time 3. 
I 
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I We see that the use of these meta-priority rules along with our 
possibilistic reasoning process leads to the correct results in this litmus 
test situation. 372 
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(1) 
(2) 
{3} 
(4) 
{5) 
References 
McCarthy, J., "Epistemological problems in artificial intelligence," 
Proc. Int. Joint Conf. on A. I., Cambridge, Mass., 223-227, 1977 
Ric h, E., "Default reasoning as likelihood reasoning," Proc. Amer. 
Assoc. for A. I., Washington, D.C., 348-351, 1983 
Zadeh, L.A., "Syllogistic reasoning in fuzzy logic and its application 
to usuality and reasoning with dispositions," IEEE Trans. on Systems, 
Man and Cybernet ics 15, 754-763, 1985 
Yager, R.R., "On implementing usual values," Proc. Second Workshop on 
Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Philadelphia, 339-346, 1986 
Reiter, R. , "Nonmonotonic reasoning," Annual Reviews of Computer 
Science 2, 81-132, 1987. 
(6) Etherington, D.W. , "Formalizing nonmonotonic reasoning systems," 
Artificial Intelligence 31, 41-85, 1987 
(7) Yager, R.R. , "Using approximate reasoning to represent default 
knowledge," Artificial Intelligence 31, 99-112, 1987 
(8) Zadeh, L.A., "A theory of approxima te reasoning," in Machine 
Intelligence vol. 9, Hayes, J.E. , Michie, D. & Kulich, L.I. <Eds.>, 
149-194, John Wiley & Sons : New York, 1979 
(9) Imielinski, T. , "Results on translating defaults to circumscription," 
Artificial Intelligence 32, 131-146, 1987 
(10) Yager, R.R., "Probabilistic qualification and default rules," in 
Unc ert ainty in Knowledge Based Systems, Bouchon, B. & Yager, R.R., 
Springer-Verlag: Berlin, 41-57, 1987. 
<11> Reiter, R., "On reasoning by default," Proc. Second Symp. on 
Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing, Urb ana, 1978 
<12> Hanks, S. & McDermott, D., "Default reasoning, nonmonotonic l og i c s and 
the frame problem," Proc AAAI-86, Philadelphia, 328-333, 1986 
(13> Pearl, J. "A probabilistic treatment of the Yale shooting problem," 
Tech. Report CSD-8700XX, R-100, UCLA, 1987 
{14) Shoham, Y. , "Chronological ignorance: time, nonmonotonicity., necess ity 
and causal theories," Proc. AAAI-86, Philadelphia, 389-393, 1986 
373 
